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Article 1

ARTICLES

Confirmatory Legislative History

*

James J. Brudney†
INTRODUCTION
Textualists and intentionalists regularly lock horns over
the proper approach to construing statutory language regarded
as inconclusive. The interpretive debate seems less contentious,
however, when the words of the law are deemed clear. There
may be reasonable disagreement as to whether the text at issue
in a particular controversy has a plain meaning, but if it does
then that meaning arguably preempts further inquiry. Since
1990, Supreme Court majority opinions are replete with
declarations such as: “Given [a] straightforward statutory
command, there is no reason to resort to legislative history”; 1 or
“we do not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory text
that is clear”;2 or “[w]hen the words of a statute are
unambiguous . . . this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial
inquiry is complete.’”3
Yet despite these ringing statements, the Court in fact
often departs from its “first canon” by relying on legislative
history to confirm or reinforce what it already has concluded is
the plain meaning of statutory text. On numerous occasions
*

© 2011 James J. Brudney. All rights reserved.
Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law, and Visiting Professor of Law, Fordham University
School of Law, Fall 2010. I am grateful to Larry Baum and Larry Solan for thoughtful
comments on this draft, to Jimmie Friday, Randy Hart, and Karin Johnsrud for
valuable research assistance, and to Jen Pursell for fine secretarial support.
1
United States v. Gonzalez, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997).
2
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994); see also Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (quoting Ratzlaf with approval).
3
Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992) (quoting Rubin v.
United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
†
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since 2006, the Roberts Court has invoked legislative history as
a confirmatory asset. Six of these majorities, including four
cases decided during the 2009 term, have drawn sharp rebukes
from Justice Scalia.4 Beyond expressing his general hostility
toward legislative history, Justice Scalia has criticized the
confirmatory use of legislative record evidence as incentivizing
wasteful research by lawyers.5 He discounts such reliance as a
misleading makeweight that, although never the real reason
for a court’s decision, has disturbingly antidemocratic
implications with respect to the role of judges.6
This essay takes issue with Justice Scalia’s view of
confirmatory legislative history. It maintains that persistent
judicial reliance on such history reflects important shortcomings
in the textualist approach. When courts move beyond the
presumptively clear meaning of statutory language, they
recognize—even if implicitly—that assertions of clarity can too
often serve as either a mirage or a refuge. Clarity may be a
mirage because apparently precise words or phrases often give
rise to conflicting “plain meanings,” and also because apparently
assured readers of those words or phrases are conditioned to
perceive clarity based on their own specialized training,
background, and level of self-confidence. Assertions of clarity
may serve as a refuge in that they obviate the need for judges to
provide more complete explanations for their decisions. This
aspiration for completeness, although not embraced by Justice
Scalia, is important to many other judges as they seek to explain
adjudicative resolutions before the diverse audiences to whom
they are responsive and responsible.
4

See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2287, 2289 (2010) (Stevens,
J.); id. at 2293-94 (Scalia, J., concurring); Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 224142 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.); id. at 2242 (Scalia, J., concurring); Jerman v. Carlisle,
McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605, 1615-17 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.);
id. at 1626-28 (Scalia, J., concurring); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1332 (2010) (Sotomayor, J.); id. at 1341-42 (Scalia, J.,
concurring); United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 275-77 (2008) (Stevens, J.); id. at
277 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring); Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 500-01
(2006) (Alito, J.); id. at 509-11 (Scalia, J., concurring). For additional recent majority
opinions relying on legislative history to confirm or reinforce textual plain meaning, see
Harbison v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1481, 1485-90 (2009); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women,
Inc., 547 U.S. 9, 16-20 (2006); and Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 388-93 (2005).
5
See, e.g., Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., concurring); Milavetz, 130
S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring); Zedner, 547 U.S. at 510 (Scalia, J, concurring).
6
See, e.g., Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2293 (Scalia, J., concurring); Carr, 130 S.
Ct. at 2242 (Scalia, J., concurring); Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1628 (Scalia, J., concurring);
Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1342 (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S.
326, 344-45 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 45253 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Part I reviews the use of confirmatory legislative history
and identifies Justice Scalia’s objections. Part II explains why
judges continue to rely on such history, and how that reliance
relates to the inadequacies of an overly language-based
approach to statutory interpretation.
I.

CRITICIZING CONFIRMATORY HISTORY

The Court’s use of legislative history to corroborate that
statutory text means what it appears to say is not a recent
development. Writing in the early 1980s, Judge Patricia Wald
cited numerous decisions from the 1981 term in which the
majority analyzed legislative record materials for confirmatory
purposes.7 As far back as the 1920s, Justice Holmes opined that
the so-called plain meaning rule was subject to the gloss of
congressional intent.8 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, some
judges and legal academics expressed concern that legislative
history might be surpassing statutory language as the
foundational interpretive asset.9 The rise of textualism,
consistently championed by Justice Scalia during his twentyfive years on the Court, has curtailed that trend and restored
the primacy of enacted text.
Primacy, however, need not entail exclusivity. Justice
Scalia’s initial barrage of separate opinions challenging the
Court’s reliance on legislative history10 included an insistence
that legislative materials ought to never be invoked to reinforce

7

See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History
in the 1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 197-99 (1983) (discussing nine
examples from a single term).
8
Bos. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928) (“It is said
that when the meaning of language is plain we are not to resort to evidence in order to
raise doubts. That is rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law. . . . If Congress
has been accustomed to use a certain phrase with a more limited meaning than might
be attributed to it by common practice it would be arbitrary to refuse to consider that
fact when we come to interpret a statute.”).
9
See Wald, supra note 7, at 200-05 (discussing reservations about the
reliability, relevance, and thoroughness of various legislative materials); see also REED
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 164 (1975) (referring
to “the Canadian gibe that in the United States whenever the legislative history is
ambiguous it is permissible to refer to the statute”).
10
See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on
Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 117, 161 (2008) (discussing twelve Scalia concurrences and dissents written in
his first three terms).
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the plain meaning of text.11 Scalia continued to object to
confirmatory history during the Rehnquist Court years.12 His
rhetorical intensity—directed at a wide range of colleagues—
remains unabated in the Roberts era.13
From Justice Scalia’s vantage point, reliance on
legislative history to confirm plain meaning is unacceptable for
a number of reasons. Some of these reasons might fairly be
viewed as deriving from his core position that legislative
history should be altogether inadmissible as an interpretive
resource. Thus, Scalia criticizes confirmatory usage as a form of
“intellectual piling-on [that] has addictive consequences”
because it acculturates judges to believing that legislative
history is intrinsically reliable.14 Relatedly, he insists that such
usage gives rise to a slippery slope: once legislative history is
deemed relevant to confirm the clear meaning of text, it may be
considered relevant to question or even contradict that clear
meaning, “thus rendering what is plain ambiguous.”15 Scalia
also condemns reliance on confirmatory references, as he does
reliance in general, for more pragmatic reasons: it effectively
prescribes “wasteful over-lawyering” at clients’ expense “merely
for the sake of completeness.”16
Of particular interest are two other Scalia criticisms
that identify potentially distinctive problems with the
confirmatory approach. One involves its allegedly superfluous
nature. If the text is clear on its face, then confirmatory
legislative history is by definition duplicative and hence
entirely unnecessary.17 This redundant role exemplifies how
“legislative history is almost never the real reason for the

11

See, e.g., United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 371-77 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Taylor, 487 U.S. at 344-45 (Scalia, J., concurring); Cardoza-Fonseca, 480
U.S. at 452-53 (Scalia, J., concurring).
12
See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267
(2004) (Scalia, J., concurring); Bank One Chi. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S.
264, 279-83 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring).
13
The six Roberts-era decisions cited supra note 4 were authored by Justices
Alito, Stevens, and Sotomayor. The five earlier decisions cited supra notes 11-12 were
authored by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg.
14
Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 510 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
15
Id. at 510-11; see also Taylor, 487 U.S. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring).
16
Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, LPA, 130 S. Ct. 1605,
1627 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1342 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring).
17
See, e.g., Intel Corp., 524 U.S. at 267 (Scalia, J., concurring); Bank One, 516
U.S. at 282-83 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Court’s decision—and make-weights do not deserve a lot of the
Court’s time.”18
The second notable criticism involves the allegedly
antidemocratic aspects of using confirmatory history. Scalia
expressed this concern early in his tenure on the Court.
Emphasizing that the role of judges is to “interpret laws rather
than reconstruct legislators’ intentions,” he reasoned that
where the language of the laws is clear, courts are not free to
consider unenacted intent as a possible supplement or
replacement.19 If courts allow for the possibility that legislative
history is capable of altering plain meaning, they foster a
lawmaking culture in which members of Congress understand
that they can avoid the arduous work of negotiating and
enacting a floor amendment for the simpler task of
promulgating a floor colloquy.20 To encourage such efforts by
blessing them as potentially probative undermines our
constitutional democracy. Judges who denigrate or discount the
challenge of securing approval for statutory language from both
chambers and the President are effectively promoting a lack of
political accountability for our elected officials.21
Each of these two criticisms is rooted in Justice Scalia’s
commitment to a semantic approach when interpreting
statutes. His view that ordinary meaning, supplemented by
structural and language canons, constitutes “the real reason”
for judicial decisions reflects his confidence that there is a
single solution to interpretive controversies and that languagebased analysis is all conscientious judges need in order to
discover it.22 Likewise, Scalia’s objection to the possibility that
legislative history is available to confirm ordinary meaning
reflects his conviction that judges undermine their neutral,
apolitical responsibility as interpreters of Congress’s textual
18

Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2294 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(emphasis added); see also Jerman, 130 S. Ct. at 1628 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is
almost invariably the case that our opinions benefit not at all from the make-weight
use of legislative history.”).
19
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 452, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
20
See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 345 (Scalia, J., concurring); see generally Zedner v.
United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509-11 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
21
See Hon. Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History be an
Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 807, 808 (1998).
22
Samantar, 130 S. Ct. at 2294 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing his approach to
construing statutes: “first, find the ordinary meaning of the language in its textual
context; and second, using established canons of construction, ask whether there is any
clear indication that some permissible meaning other than the ordinary one applies”).
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work product by consulting the politically generated record of
Congress’s enactment process.
II.

JUSTIFYING CONFIRMATORY HISTORY

A core premise of Justice Scalia’s textualist philosophy
is that there is almost invariably a single plain meaning for
disputed statutory language. He does not expect that this one
exact meaning will necessarily be obvious or readily perceived,
but he is prepared to work hard to avoid ambiguity. Toward
that end, Scalia employs a diverse semantic toolkit for his
statutory opinions—dictionary definitions, identical words or
phrases as previously applied in other laws, and multiple
canons related to the grammar and structure of statutory text.
He invokes these tools to identify a reading that is sufficiently
clear so as to disqualify other plausible interpretations.23 An
implicit assumption in Justice Scalia’s “hard textualist”
approach is that when these semantic tools establish lack of
ambiguity, the resultant construction is correct—not simply
preferred on the basis of shrewd inferences or educated
guesses.24 The correct construction in turn precludes reference
to the nonsemantic contextual source of legislative history.
There are sound reasons why so many judges and scholars do
not share Justice Scalia’s semantically based confidence, as
discussed in the sections that follow.
A.

Concerns Regarding the Conclusiveness of Plain Meaning

Many judges and scholars are not convinced that
statutory meaning can be regularly rendered singularly correct
based only on language-related considerations.25 There are, of
course, the proverbial easy cases, but the majority of those are
not litigated to the circuit court level, much less accorded
discretionary review by the Supreme Court. When statutory
23

See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 224-34 (1994);
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 251-63 (1993); W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v.
Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86-92, 97-99 (1991).
24
Cf. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 435 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority for disregarding well-settled principles of statutory
construction by pronouncing “a seemingly clear provision . . . ‘ambiguous’ sans textual
and structural analysis”).
25
See generally JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION
AND REGULATION 111-12, 232-33 (2010) (discussing lack of agreement among judges
and scholars regarding what exactly qualifies as unambiguous text and which
ambiguity-resolving tools ought to be given priority).
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disputes reach the Court, the justices often regard the
contested text as allowing for two distinct yet plausible plain
meanings. Some justices may insist that the language is so
clear it can only be read one way, while others point to a
comparably tenable alternative reading of the same language—
adding that their assertion of plain meaning is supported or
confirmed by accompanying legislative history.26
The existence of more than one plausible plain meaning
for contested text is a function of several factors. On a semantic
level, Lawrence Solan has pointed to the tension between a
word’s ordinary usage, which is what it prototypically signifies,
and a word’s definitional usage, which includes a broader range
of options.27 Because members of Congress may well have both
prototypical and definitional aspects in mind, judges cannot
readily “assume that any instance of a statutory word that
strays from the prototype is necessarily outside a statute’s
scope.”28 Prior to 1980, the justices often relied on
straightforward introspection to discover ordinary meaning.29
Since Justice Scalia’s arrival, however, the Court tends to
identify ordinary meaning by invoking multiple specific
resources, including dictionaries as well as similar language
from the same or other statutes.30 This expansion of sources has
led to increased divisiveness, particularly when the justices
26

See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111-19, 133-40
(2001) (Justices Kennedy and Souter advance competing semantic readings of “engaged
in interstate commerce,” and Souter invokes legislative history for additional support);
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-87, 495-501 (1999) (Justices
O’Connor and Stevens advance competing semantic readings of “physical or mental
impairment,” and Stevens invokes legislative history for additional support); Mertens,
508 U.S. at 255-59, 263-73 (Justices Scalia and White advance competing semantic
readings of “equitable relief,” and White invokes legislative history for additional
support); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 623-29, 633-39 (1982) (Justices White and
O’Connor advance competing semantic readings of “records compiled for law
enforcement purposes,” and White invokes legislative history for additional support).
27
See Lawrence M. Solan, The New Textualists’ New Text, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 2027, 2042-46 (2005). Justice Scalia has shown sensitivity to this distinction at
times as well. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (“The Court
does not appear to grasp the distinction between how a word can be used and how it
ordinarily is used.”) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28
Solan, supra note 27, at 2046. See, e.g., Smith, 508 U.S. at 228-33, 241-44
(presenting disagreement over prototypical versus definitional meaning of “use”);
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 395-402, 410-13 (1991) (presenting disagreement over
prototypical versus definitional meaning of “representative”).
29
See, e.g., Greyhound Corp. v. Mount Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S. 322, 33031 (1978); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172-74 (1978); Burns v. Alcala, 420
U.S. 575, 580-81 (1975).
30
See Solan, supra note 27, at 2054-55 (reporting on 122 cases since 1817
that relied on the ordinary meaning rule, including forty-seven decided since 1980).
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engage in recurrent dictionary wars over what constitutes
ordinary meaning.31
Another source of disagreement about plain meaning stems
from the indefinite nature of important statutory terms. Congress’s
use of words like “reasonable,” “recognized,” “interfere,” “restrain,”
or “modify”32 reflects its interest in flexibility, anticipating that
citizens, agencies, and courts will adapt a statute’s application in
light of altered or novel circumstances. This in turn raises the
possibility that a prototypical or definitional meaning may give rise
to plausible conflicting applications when the word is considered in
its statutory setting. To take one example, the Federal
Communications Commission Act authorizes the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to “modify” any tariff-filing
requirement; the issue in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT &
T Co.33 was whether the commission’s decision to make tariff filing
optional for nondominant long distance carriers was a valid
exercise of this authority. Assuming that the plain meaning of
“modify” is minor or incremental change, as opposed to change that
is more basic or important,34 a court still must decide whether the
FCC’s detariffing initiative reflects a minor or major shift in its
requirements. This choice in turn implicates two competing
readings of the policies underlying Congress’s rate-filing
requirement.35
Apart from divergent understandings as to what
constitutes the plain meaning of a statutory term or phrase,
31

See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998); MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994). See generally Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L.
Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use
of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999) (demonstrating subjective and highly
variable use of dictionaries); see also William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in
Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 234-40 (2000) (contending that reliance
on use of same term in other statutes is prone to judicial manipulation).
32
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006) (authorizing award of reasonable
attorney’s fees to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases); 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2006)
(requiring employers to provide a place of employment “free from recognized hazards”
that are likely to result in death or serious physical harm); 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006)
(prohibiting employers from interfering with or restraining employees in the exercise of
rights to engage in concerted activities such as organizing and collective bargaining);
47 U.S.C. § 203(b) (2006) (authorizing Federal Communications Commission to modify
tariff-filing requirements for communications common carriers).
33
512 U.S. 218 (1994).
34
But cf. id. at 225-28, 240-42 (presenting disagreement between Justices
Scalia and Stevens as to whether definition of “modify” covers only minor shift from
status quo ante or also applies to more substantial adjustment).
35
See id. at 229-34, 242-45 (presenting disagreement between Justices Scalia
and Stevens over whether change in rate-filing requirement should be considered
against backdrop of carriers’ obligations to file (a major shift) or against backdrop of
policies behind rate-filing requirements (a minor shift)).
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based on semantic or policy considerations, judges also differ in
doctrinal terms about how to construct plain meaning as a
predicate for judicial review. These differences—often framed
as disagreements over identifying and weighing the factors
that contribute to ambiguity—further complicate the task of
determining a single plain meaning. Thus, for instance, when
the Court considers the correct application of the Rule of Lenity
to criminal statutes, some justices contend that a statutory
term or phrase is not clear unless the government uses “text,
structure, and history . . . to establish that [its] position is
unambiguously correct.”36 Others maintain that a text is clear
for Lenity purposes unless it suffers from “grievous ambiguity
or uncertainty,” meaning that—based on text, structure, and
history—the Court can make “no more than a guess as to what
Congress intended.”37 Similarly, when deciding whether
Congress has directly and clearly addressed an issue for
purposes of applying stage one of the Chevron test, the justices
disagree as to whether legislative history may be considered
along with text and structure in order to ascertain clarity.38
Finally, those who interpret or apply statutory text
bring to the interpretive enterprise both individual specialized
backgrounds and distinctive degrees of self-assurance.
Government bureaucrats who receive formal training or
extensive ad hoc instruction in the intricacies of a complex
statutory scheme may believe they have little discretion
because the meaning of key terms or phrases seems entirely
clear to them, even if ordinary citizens might not perceive the
same clarity.39 Similarly, judges rely on a range of “objective”
interpretive assets as part of their effort to avoid charges of
subjective decision making; framing judicial decisions as
“inevitable” promotes the vision of a coherent and continuous

36

Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 148 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also United
States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347-49 (1971) (Marshall, J.).
37
Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 138-39 (Breyer, J.) (internal citations omitted); see
also United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
38
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-37, 441-49 (1987) (Stevens, J.);
id. at 452-54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
39
See Edward L. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1299, 1328-33 (1997) (discussing different mechanisms used by German and American
bank regulators and the inclination of many regulators to deny that they are exercising
discretion when applying statutory text).
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body of law.40 Although some judges candidly acknowledge that
interpreting statutes involves an irreducible element of
discretion or even intuition,41 they express varying degrees of
confidence in the inevitable correctness of justifications
accompanying their holdings. Thus, Justice Scalia is famously
bullish about being able to find the single right answer in text
alone.42 By contrast, Justice Ginsburg looks to legislative
history to help complete her interpretive task, albeit with an
attitude of “hopeful skepticism.”43 And Justice Breyer, whose
background includes experience as a Senate committee counsel,
believes courts must never abandon the effort of seeking to
identify legislative intent even though that effort can be at
times quite arduous.44
Underlying these divergent perspectives about statutory
language—and the possible impact of policy considerations and
interpreter backgrounds with respect to such language—is the
reality that statutes are not disembodied textual products but
rather are part of a purposive communicative process. Like
other forms of purposive communication, their meaning is a
function of participants’ intentions as well as dictionary
definitions and the semantic properties of sentences.45 Even
Justice Scalia has been known to invoke the concept of
congressional intent in some judicial opinions, notwithstanding
the dismissive approach he adopts in extrajudicial settings.46
40

See generally Dan Simon, A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision
Making, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 14-17 (1998); William N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 378-79 (1990).
41
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 107-08 (2008); Judith S.
Kaye, The Human Dimension in Appellate Judging: A Brief Reflection on a Timeless
Concern, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1004, 1006-07 (1988); Patricia Wald, Thoughts on
Decisionmaking, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1984).
42
See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (1989) (“One who finds more often (as I do) that the
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other
laws, thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference
exists. It is thus relatively rare that Chevron will require me to accept an
interpretation which, though reasonable, I would not personally adopt.”).
43
See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, To Be Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 224 (1993).
44
STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 100 (2010).
45
See Cheryl Boudreau et al., What Statutes Mean: Interpretive Lessons from
Positive Theories of Communication and Legislation, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 957, 961-71 (2007).
46
Compare ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 16-17 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (rejecting as incompatible with fair or democratic government “to
have the meaning of a law determined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by
what the lawgiver promulgated”), with Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 90 (1990)
(Scalia, J.) (invoking what “Congress had in mind”), Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,
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In contrast to Justice Scalia, however, judges who
instinctively look beyond plain meaning for reassurance or
confirmation believe they are engaged in a more complete task
as interpreters. The search for completeness reflects a sense of
what many if not most judges regard as a properly responsive
and responsible role.
B.

Concerns Regarding the Responsible Role of Judges

From the early days of the Supreme Court, justices have
observed that when “labour[ing] to discover the design of the
legislature, [a judge] seizes every thing from which aid can be
derived.”47 More recently, the Court has explained that in a
confirmatory setting “common sense suggests that inquiry
benefits from reviewing additional information rather than
ignoring it.”48 This judicial instinct to explore all potentially
relevant information is cross-cultural if not universal. In
Britain, even when the House of Lords prohibited courts from
consulting legislative history at all to aid in construing enacted
laws, there were distinguished jurists who confessed—in their
opinions and on the floor of Parliament—to peeking at the
legislative record evidence in search of further enlightenment.49
The quest for completeness when interpreting
presumptively clear text is in part a search for reassurance.
There is a lingering fear that in exceptional circumstances, “the
literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters . . . . [or
will] thwart the obvious purpose of the statute.”50 Judges are
prepared to examine and evaluate all available resources in an
effort to avoid error or injustice.
490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same), and Holloway v. United States,
526 U.S. 1, 20 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (critical of majority decision as promoting a
result “so arbitrary that it is difficult to believe Congress intended it”). See generally
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION
102-04 (2010) (discussing Justice Scalia’s use of intentionalist talk in his opinions).
47
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 386 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.).
48
Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 611-12 n.4 (1991) (White,
J.,), cited with approval in Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2287 n.9 (2010).
49
See James J. Brudney, The Story of Pepper v. Hart: Examining Legislative
History Across the Pond, in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION STORIES 258, 262-63 (William
N. Eskridge Jr. et al., eds., 2011) (reporting remarks by Lord Denning in a 1979 Court
of Appeal opinion and by Lord Templeman during a 1989 debate in the House of
Lords). The House of Lords overruled its precedent in 1992 and has allowed courts to
consult legislative history since that time. See id. at 271-77.
50
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (Rehnquist,
J.) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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But the judicial pursuit of confirmatory evidence involves
more than concern over possible error. Judges are trained and
socialized to believe in the value of interpreting the law in a
skillful and impartial manner.51 Bracketing for present purposes
whether judges also derive satisfaction as interpreters from
promoting their own policy goals, it seems evident that “judges
who want the respect of practicing lawyers, legal academics, and
other judges have an incentive to be perceived as committed to
the law and skilled in its interpretation.”52
Invoking legislative history in a confirmatory setting is
likely to enhance a judge’s stature with numerous audiences.
To begin with, confirmatory discussion may be viewed as an
aspect of judicial accountability. The parties and their
attorneys—who may not agree with one another on the clarity
of text—present legislative-history arguments in an effort to
inform and persuade the court. When courts consider these
arguments as part of the written decision-making process, they
exhibit respect for attorneys’ efforts and in doing so attest to
the procedural neutrality of our judicial system. Judges who
cite legislative history in confirmatory contexts also express—
at least implicitly—that the parties’ arguments appropriately
contribute to the truth-seeking approach underlying our
competitive advocacy process.
In addition, consideration of confirmatory legislative
record evidence promotes transparency by making it clear to
fellow judges and other attorneys that the court has not ignored
or suppressed assertedly relevant interpretive factors. Without a
willingness to engage legislative history arguments, even in the
face of apparently clear text, judges risk sliding into more
conclusory and less deliberative thinking on appropriately
contested statutory matters.53 Justice Scalia belittles this quest
for completeness,54 but others embrace it to signal that judges
are acting responsibly by illuminating all plausible arguments
as an essential aspect of their reasoned decision making.
Further, the courts’ commitment to addressing
legislative history as a confirmatory asset provides guidance to
repeat litigants, notably the executive branch and interest
51

See LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES 54 (2006).
Id. at 106.
53
See generally Ethan J. Lieb & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in
Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47 (2010), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/
images/pdfs/900.pdf.
54
See supra text accompanying note 16.
52
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groups that pursue or resist diverse regulatory agendas. It does
so by more fully integrating legislative history as a resource in
ongoing interpretive conversations between courts and these
repeat players. This kind of methodological completeness has
special value when one recognizes that legislative history may
serve distinct functions with respect to different subject areas
addressed by Congress. The executive branch must construe
and apply statutes that feature, inter alia, varying degrees of
semantic detail, technical complexity, ideological compromise,
and potential for constitutional controversy.55 Courts’ review
and evaluation of confirmatory history in these settings reflect
a willingness to help agencies and other regular litigants
navigate the diverse challenges they face when implementing
Congress’s instructions.
Finally, the courts’ use of legislative-record evidence for
confirmatory purposes respects the role of Congress in the
lawmaking process. Justice Scalia’s fear that this practice
incentivizes legislators to avoid the hard work of passing clear
text rests on a key misunderstanding of why legislative history
matters. Reports from permanent standing committees and
published verbatim records of floor debates are the result of
innovations in legislative design that were authorized under
Article I of our Constitution.56 From the early nineteenth
century onward, Congress has expanded its record-keeping
requirements as it developed more detailed procedures for
keeping itself informed during the lengthy and complex
processes by which bills are introduced, discussed, modified,
and approved.57 Members’ reliance on legislative history in
helping them understand the meaning of the text on which
they will vote remains robust today.58
55

See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory
Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law,
58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1260-65, 1276-90 (2009) (differentiating between how legislative
history educates and persuades members of Congress in tax legislation versus
workplace laws, and how the Supreme Court has grasped and applied the distinctions);
Lieb & Serota, supra note 53, at 54-55 (discussing more restricted role for imputed
intent with respect to criminal law legislative history).
56
See James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political
Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1199, 1217-22 (2010) (discussing early
congressional commitment to publication over secrecy, and to organizing legislative
production through standing committees rather than select committees).
57
See id. (describing move to daily official publication of full floor proceedings
and regular internal distribution of standing committee reports, and explaining that
documents were produced for benefit of members themselves as well as broader public).
58
See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 55, at 1292 & n.249 (referring to
multiple statements from republican and democratic legislators since the late 1980s).
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Given this constitutionally and historically grounded
tradition, courts’ consultation of legislative history to confirm
textual meaning signifies their readiness to invoke the same
materials that legislators have long used to inform and
persuade one another. Members and their staffs know the
difference between enacted text and explanatory colloquies;
further, they generally can be expected to know when these
colloquies exist primarily to clarify or amplify meaning rather
than to paper over disagreements. While there will be
anecdotal instances of legislative history being planted in an
effort to assuage wavering legislators or to sway gullible
judges, such instances are anecdotal and also readily
detectable.59 Justice Scalia’s belief that invoking confirmatory
legislative history will effectively invite members to excuse or
conceal failures to reach a textual bargain reflects insufficient
appreciation for how Congress operates and has operated for
nearly two centuries.60
CONCLUSION
This essay has explored the link between judges’ use of
legislative history for confirmatory purposes and certain limits
on how much work language alone can do in statutory
interpretation. Over the past quarter century, Justice Scalia
has played a formidable role in elevating discourse on the
importance of close textual analysis and the related utility of
language and structural canons. His contributions and
thinking have greatly enriched our understanding of the
interpretive enterprise, from a pragmatic and constitutional as
well as a semantic standpoint. At the same time, by framing
the debate over legislative history in terms of admissibility
rather than weight, Scalia and other textualists have shaped

59

See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1994); see also
James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:
Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1, 47-56 (1994) (rejecting arguments
for systemically discounting legislative history based on asserted manipulation by
committee staff or unrepresentative character of standing committees).
60
Relatedly, this argument also undervalues the role of purposive or
intentionalist readings of statutes in allowing voters to understand and respond at the
ballot box to the lawmaking results Congress meant to put in place. As Justice Breyer
has recently explained, when courts use canons, dictionaries, and grammar arguments
alone to determine a statute’s scope, meaning, or enforcement impact, it is far more
likely that voters will be responding to (and passing judgment on) meanings that
Congress never dreamed it was enacting—one result being a more flawed operation of
democratic accountability. See BREYER, supra note 44, at 94-96.
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an interpretive conversation that too often has been
impoverished in its nature and focus.
During the mid 1980s, then-Judge Scalia invoked the
British “exclusionary rule” to help justify his emergent position
of rejecting any role for legislative history.61 The British courts,
however, have long abandoned the exclusionary approach;
instead, they recognize that legislative history statements are
at times useful as an interpretive resource, “perhaps especially
as a confirmatory aid.”62 British judges and legal academics now
grapple with the extent to which their legislative history may
illuminate the meaning of enacted text in particular types of
complex statutory settings.63 Similar challenging questions of
retail application rather than wholesale exclusion remain to be
explored in the U.S. context as well.64 Recognizing why judges
so often turn to legislative history for reinforcement and
assurance may encourage us to move beyond debates over
admissibility, and to address these types of interpretive
challenges at both judicial and academic levels.

61

See Judge Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History 1-2 (delivered
between fall 1985 and spring 1986 at various law schools) (transcript on file with author).
62
Harding v. Wealands, [2006] UKHL 32, [2006] 4 All. E.R. 1, 25 (Lord
Carswell). For discussion of other recent confirmatory uses by Britain’s highest court,
see Brudney, supra note 49, at 284.
63
See, e.g., Wilson v. First Cnty. Trust Ltd., [2003] UKHL 40, [2003] 4 All
E.R. 97 (discussing consultation of Hansard materials to help determine a statute’s
compatibility with European Convention of Human Rights); Regina v. Sec’y of State for
the Env’t ex parte Spath Holme Ltd., [2001] 1 All E.R. 195 (discussing relevance of
Hansard materials when considering scope of government’s discretionary powers
conferred by statute).
64
In addition to the differential role played by legislative history in different
subject area settings, discussed supra note 55 and accompanying text, courts and
scholars might consider (a) whether legislative history accompanying omnibus bills is
less suitable for judicial use because congressional deals on such a grand scale are far
more likely to be indecipherable; (b) whether legislative history should be presumed to
carry less weight where the law is administered primarily by a federal agency rather
than private parties; and (c) whether legislative history should be regarded as
presumptively more valuable for controversies involving apparent lack of foresight as
opposed to those arising from demonstrable failure to reach congressional consensus.

